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INTRODUCTION

With the increasing use of electronic word processing and computer technology to store information, the question arises as to
whether the ease of accessibility of computer data bases, in either an
authorized or unauthorized manner, acts as a de facto waiver of the
privileged status of confidential information. The potential for
problems in this area has increased with the expanding use of computers by the legal profession. Lawyers have discovered the increased
efficiency of creating legal documents with word processors. Some
courts have discovered that computers do a more efficient job of ar2
ranging court dockets,1 and computer programs, such as LEXIS
and WESTLAW,3 have created huge legal data bases to assist in
legal research. The acceptance of the computer in the legal world
has been grudging but inexorable. Given the growing acceptance of
computer technology in law offices, both law firms and corporate law
departments must consider the ramifications of creating computer
data bases that contain confidential information.
The types of confidential information that can be stored in computer data bases include communications occurring within the context of a special relationship, such as an attorney-client or physicianpatient relationship, and thus protected by an evidentiary or testimonial privilege against disclosure, work product materials, and business information constituting trade secrets. Generally, in order to
maintain an evidentiary privilege against the disclosure of confiden1. See Nihan & Wheeler, Using Technology to Improve the Administration of Justice

In the Federal Courts, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 659 (1981).
2. See LExis Library Contents (March 1984).
3.

See WESTLAW FOR STUDENTs 73-85 (1983).
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tial information, the communication4 or, in the case of a trade secret,
the information itself,5 must be cloaked in secrecy. The communication or information must remain confidential. In a noncomputer situation, this might involve maintaining a manual file system to which
access is strictly monitored. The commingling of confidential and
non-confidential documents might act as a waiver of the privilege
and subject the confidential documents to legal discovery by opposing parties.6
One could argue that a locked manual file system or safe can be
broken into by a skilled burglar, just as a computer system can be
accessed by an adept computer technician who can "unlock" the
mathematical codes that protect the system. In reality, the computer
system is no more accessible than the manual file. In fact, the computer system may be safer than a manual system because there are
fewer individuals with the technical knowledge to break into a computer. Yet newspaper stories concerning the security problems of
financial data bases highlight the problem of computer accessibility.
Unlike breaking into a file room, accessing a data base to "steal" or
change financial information is not always immediately discoverable,
and the huge financial losses that can result might remain undetected until audits are conducted. Moreover, the increased attention
given to the problems of computer security raises questions for
courts considering the legal ramifications of storing confidential information on computer data bases.
This article analyzes the legal effects of placing privileged and
confidential business information into computer data bases. Part II
of this article explores whether evidentiary testimonial privileges are
waived where unauthorized personnel may intentionally or inadvertently learn the contents of confidential documents stored in computerized data bases. This discussion is conducted from the perspective
of law firms, which may utilize outside service organizations to
maintain their computer equipment, and corporate legal departments, which may utilize the vast computer resources existing within
the corporation. Part III of this article conducts a similar exploration
with respect to the storage of confidential business information in
computer data bases. Finally, part IV discusses recommendations
and solutions for maintaining the confidentiality of computer stored
information.
4.

See infra notes 19-46 and accompanying text.

5.
6.

See infra notes 172-83 and accompanying text.
2 D. LOuISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 212, at 571-72 (1978).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

II.

[Vol. 12:849

TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES

A. Attorney-Client Privilege
1. Historical Development.-The privilege of refusing to disclose information discussed between attorney and client is one of the

oldest and most important of the testimonial privileges. 7 In English
jurisprudence, the rationale for the privilege was based on the concept of "honor among gentlemen," a singular and peculiarly English
notion that a gentleman's sense of honor would compel him to keep
secret that which had been told to him in confidence.' Although the
attorney was not compelled to disclose this confidence, the client

could be so compelled by a bill of discovery. 9 In contrast, the rationale for the privilege in America has emphasized the need to encourage explicit and candid communications and full disclosure of all
facts between the attorney and client, to enable the attorney to fulfill
the duty of providing the client with the best representation
possible. 10
The theory underlying the attorney-client privilege is that
proper representation outweighs the possible harm that may arise

from suppressing evidence." The opponents of a strong attorney-cli7. Id. § 207, at 504-05.
8. Id. at 505. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
Aside from the pragmatic approach to the privilege, the importance of this doctrine has
been emphasized in the developing area of privacy law regarding the right to be left alone in
certain special communicative relations. This concern was recognized by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals when it stated that "[tihe basis for the privilege is to afford the client a
reasonable expectation of privacy and confidentiality with regard to disclosures made during
the course of consultation with his attorney." In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719,
728 (7th Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). Finally, it has been suggested that it is fundamentally
unfair to force an attorney to disclose damaging admissions made to him by his client. See
generally Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court
Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101, 111 (1956).
9. 6 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 146 (1942).
10. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
I1. 6 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, supra note 9, at 147.
This rationale has been long recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court which stated that the
privilege "is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid
of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be
safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure." Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888). The purpose of the privilege "is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice." Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). "The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need
for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out." Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 51 (1980). It is interesting to note that European observers believe that the privilege aids
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ent privilege, however, complain that nondisclosure is the antithesis
of an inquiry into the truth.1 2 The United States Supreme Court has
recognized the suppressive effect of the privilege and has limited the
privilege to protect only those communications that might not have
been made absent the privilege, and which are necessary to obtain
13
informed legal advice.
2. Elements of Attorney-Client Privilege.-According to Dean
Wigmore's treatise on evidence, the following elements comprise the
attorney-client privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communication
relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected, (7) from disclosure
by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be
4

waived.'

Courts have generally placed the burden of establishing these elements upon the party asserting the privilege.' 5
It is important to note that the the privilege protects only the
communications between attorney and client for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, not the information contained in the communications.' If the information discussed between the attorney and client is available from other sources, it will be discoverable from those
sources. 17 Therefore, a basic premise of this article will be that storing communications in computer data bases does not broaden or enlarge the attorney-client privilege, because the information in the
data base is still discoverable from other sources. It is thus suggested
that in determining attorney-client privilege claims, computer data
bases be treated in the same way as a manual file system.
As noted above, in order for the attorney-client privilege to exfact-finding by avoiding perjury. See 2 D.

LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
207, at 508 (1978).
12. See, e.g., Morgan, Some Observations Concerning a Model Code of Evidence, 89 U.
PA. L. REV. 145, 153 (1940).
13. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
14. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2292, at 554. See also United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 298 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Bonanno, 344 F.2d 830, 833 (2d Cir. 1965); In re Grand Jury Supeona Duces Tecum, 391 F.
Supp. 1029, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Baucus, 377 F. Supp. 468, 474 (D. Mont.
1974); United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 347 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
16. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
17. See id.; see also 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 209, at 528

(1978).
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tend to attorney-client communications, the statements must be
made in confidence. 8 The term "confidence" requires that the communications have not been disclosed to others,' 9 and whether a par-

ticular communication is confidential depends largely on the circumstances.20 It has been suggested, for example, that the presence of a

third party who overhears the communication destroys the privilege
because such a circumstance indicates that the communication was
never intended to be confidential.21 In addition, subsequent acts by
the client, such as voluntary disclosure of the communications, may
act as a waiver of the confidentiality. 22 Some authorities hold that

waiver of confidentiality must be made voluntarily.2" There is disturbing authority, however, that argues that even involuntary disclo-

sures can defeat the privilege. 4
Under the involuntary disclosure theory, even an eavesdropper
who surreptitiously hears the communication is not precluded from
testifying as to what he overheard. 25 Indeed, according to Dean Wigmore's treatise on evidence, involuntary disclosures of privileged information, such as those resulting from theft or loss, are not protected.26 Under the Wigmore approach, even though the client and
attorney are immune from being compelled to disclose privileged
matter, the client assumes the risk that some third party might ob-

tain knowledge of the privileged communication and reveal what he
learns.

Wigmore opines that this theory applies equally to stolen

privileged documents
and to surreptitiously overheard privileged
2

conversations .

11

18. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
19. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2311, at 599.
20. Id. at 600.
21. Id. at 601-03.
22. IBM v. Sperry Rand Corp., 44 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Del. 1968).
23. 8 J. WIG, ORE, supra note 8, § 2327 at 635; Magidav v. Continental Can Co., 12
F.R.D. 74, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983). But see
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transportation, 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
24. 8 J. WKtGORE, supra note 8, § 2325.
25. Id. See also 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses § 187 (1976).
26. See supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. Id. In the criminal setting, the sixth amendment often serves to shield the attorneyclient privilege from intrusion by the state. See Henry v. Perrin, 609 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir.
1979), in which a proposed prison guard inspection of an attorney's papers for textual contraband was held to have infringed upon the inmate's sixth amendment right to counsel because
"important and privileged information in a lawyer's file is vulnerable to disclosure, or at least
that the fear of meaningful disclosure is reasonable, by even a brief spot viewing of each
page." 609 F.2d at 1013. The court remanded the case to the district court to hear evidence on
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It appears, however, that the modern trend is away from Wigmore's approach and toward a standard under which the privilege
will not be lost if the attorney and client take reasonable precautions
to ensure confidentiality, but are, nonetheless, overheard by a surreptitious eavesdropper.2" In the case of In re Grand Jury Proceedings
Involving Berkley and Co.30 the federal district court, while initially
following the Wigmore approach, subsequently reversed itself on rehearing in light of what it termed the modern trend toward acceptance of the reasonable precautions standard.3 1 In Berkley, a former
corporate employee had taken the corporation's documents and disclosed them to the government.32 After noting that the employee was
not authorized to retain the subject documents, the court stated that
"[t]o the extent the documents can be viewed as stolen, following the
modern trend [the documents] should not lose the protection of the
privilege."' 33 Moreover, the court analogized the employee's unauthorized disclosure of documents to an attorney's bad faith disclosure of
client confidences without the client's approval and against the client's interest;34 the court noted that in that situation, even Wigmore
would sustain the privilege claim. 35 The court therefore concluded
that "modern precedent would seem to suggest that the documents
disclosed by [the employee] should not lose their privileged status
simply because of the manner in which they were disclosed." 3
The Federal Rules of Evidence implicitly rejected Wigmore's
harsh approach to the privilege. As originally drafted, Article V contained thirteen rules defining nonconstitutional privileges that the
federal courts should recognize, including, inter alia, lawyer-client,
husband-wife, religious, psychotherapist-patient, trade secrets, and
informer identity privileges.37 Under proposed Rule 511, no privilege
the issue of whether the security needs of the prison could be met in a manner which would be
a lesser infringement upon the inmate's right to counsel. Id. at 1014. See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966); Coplon v. United

States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
29. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
30.
31.

WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE

503(b)[02] (1982).

466 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn. 1979).
Id. at 869. The court cited 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 29, for sup-

port of this "modern trend." Id.
32.
33.

466 F. Supp. at 869.
Id.

34. Id.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
See

FED.

R. EvID. 501-513, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230-61 (1972) (proposed rules; not

enacted).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:849

would be waived unless the holder of the privilege voluntarily dis-

closed his communication. 38 Proposed Rule 503, setting forth the attorney-client privilege, defined a confidential communication as one

"not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to

whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication." 9 Although Congress chose to implement only Rule 501, which left privileges to be developed by federal
courts on a case-by-case basis, several states have enacted the proposed rules with these requirements and definitions substantially

intact.4 o
Even under Wigmore's analysis, there have always been important limitations on the general rule that disclosure to a third party
waives the privilege. The confidential nature of a communication
may be recognized despite the presence of a third party where the
third party is the confidential agent of either the client or the attorney, such as a language interpreter.4 1 This principle extends to other

experts and assistants who may be necessary to enable the lawyer to
understand certain aspects of the client's case, such as accountants,
psychiatrists and scientists. 42 Justice Traynor has stated, for exam38. Id. 511, 56 F.R.D. at 258.
39. Id. 503, 56 F.R.D. at 236 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court Standard 503
allowed the attorney-client privilege to be asserted to prevent anyone from testifying as to a
confidential communication. 503(b), 56 F.R.D. at 236. This standard, as enacted by the New
Mexico legislature states: "A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any
other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating
the rendition of professional legal services to the client . . . ." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-503
(Supp. 1975) (emphasis added). Under Supreme Court Standard 503, confidentiality is defined in terms of intent. Where the circumstances indicate an intent to keep a communication
undisclosed, the communication is confidential. Taking or failing to take precautions will have
bearing on intent. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 27, %503, at 5.
40. For a discussion of the adaptation of Supreme Court Standard 503 by the states, see
2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 27, T 503[03], at 76. The Uniform Rule 502 corresponds to Supreme Court Standard 503 due to an omission by the Uniform Commissioners of
a rule comparable to Supreme Court Standard 503. Id. The following states have adopted
either the Supreme Court Standard 503 or Uniform Rule 502 in substantially the same form:
Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Rule 502 (Supp. 1977); California, CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 952 (West 1967); Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 626-1, Rule 503 (1981); Nebraska, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 27-503 (Supp. 1978); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule
503 (1983); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06 (Supp. 1975); Oklahoma, OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502 (Supp. 1979-1980); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.225 (1981);
South Dakota, S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 19-13-2 to 4 (Supp. 1978); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 905.033 (Supp. 1979).
41. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 6, § 209, at 529. Minnesota gives interpreters protection by statute. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(8) (Supp. 1977).
42. Id. § 209, at 529-30.
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ple, that:
when communication by a client to his attorney regarding his physical or mental condition requires the assistance of a physician to
interpret the client's condition to the attorney, the client may submit to an examination by the physician without fear that the latter
will be compelled to reveal the information disclosed." 3

Similarly, the attorney's employees or "functionaries," such as
secretaries, clerks, office managers, messengers, switchboard operators, and paralegals, have all been viewed as extensions of the attor-

ney for the purpose of analyzing the privilege."" In United States v.
Kovel, 45 for example, the court stated that "the complexities of mod-

ern existence prevent attorneys from effectively handling clients' affairs without the help of others; few lawyers could now practice

without the assistance of secretaries, file clerks, telephone operators,
messengers, clerks not yet admitted to the bar, and aides of other
46

sorts."
The attorney-client privilege is meant to protect confidential
communications between the attorney and his client. Although there
is some dispute among authorities as to exactly what constitutes disclosure to a third party, all are in agreement that limited disclosure

to certain authorized personnel will not destroy the privilege.
3. Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting.-Although the attorney-client privilege has been extended to
corporations,4 7 courts have grappled with defining precisely which
corporate employees constitute the client.4 8 Since the privilege extends only to confidential communications between the client and at43. San Francisco v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 237, 231 P.2d 26,
31 (1951) (citations omitted). This situation is to be distinguished from one in which an expert
is retained with the expectation of being called as a witness that would be subject to discovery.
Here, the expert acts as an intermediary, facilitating the communication between attorney and
client, rather than simply testifying in his own behalf as an expert to support the client's
position.
44. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 6, § 209, at 530-31. "Where such persons overhear communications between lawyer and client, either because their assistance is
needed in conjunction [sic] with supplying legal representation or because they eavesdrop or
accidentally overhear or see communications between lawyer and client, the privilege is not
destroyed." Id. at 532.
45. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
46. Id. at 921.
47. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n., 320 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963); see also United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
48. See infra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
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torney and a limited group of third parties,4 9 determining who
should be considered the corporate "client" is critical to privilege
claims.
The first attempt to define the client, often referred to as the
"control group" approach,50 was enunciated in City of Philadelphia
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp." In Westinghouse, the district court
stated that the privilege applied only to a corporate employee who
was "ina position to control or even to take a substantial part in a
decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the
advice of the attorney," or who was "an authorized member of a
body or group which has that authority. ' 52 In contrast, the United
States Court of Appeals in Harper & Row Publishers,Inc. v. Decker 53 focused on the nature of the matter being communicated, 54 an
approach often known as "the scope of employment" concept.5 5 According to Decker, in order for the privilege to be applicable the employee seeking protection must have made the communication at the
behest of a superior; the subject matter of the problem on which
legal advice was to be rendered had to be within the scope of the
employee's corporate duties; and the subject matter of the communication must have been within the employee's performance of his corporate duties.5
Finally, in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 57 the Supreme Court
rejected the "control group" test as too narrow.58 In Upjohn, the corporation's general counsel was informed that certain payments may
have been made by one of the corporation's foreign subsidiaries to
foreign government officials, a possible violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.5 9 Counsel, therefore, began an internal investigation, interviewing corporate employees and officers and sending ques49. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
50. See Saltzburg, Corporate and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggested Approach, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 279 (1984).
51. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
52. Id. at 485.
53. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affid, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
54. Id. at 491-92.
55. See Saltzburg, supra note 50, at 280.
56. 423 F.2d at 491-92. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
gone even further, ruling that the communication could not be disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents. Diversified Industries,
Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978).
57. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
58. Id. at 392.
59. Id. at 386-87.
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tionnaires concerning the details of the alleged payments to foreign
managers.60 The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") subsequently demanded production of the questionnaires and the general counsel's
notes of his interviews."' The corporation declined to produce these
documents, arguing that the material was protected by the attorneyclient privilege and also constituted work product prepared in anticipation of litigation.62
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the attorney-client privilege did not apply to communications that were made
by a corporation's officers or agents who were not part of the "control group,"' 3 and that the work product doctrine did not apply to an
IRS summons. 64 The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the
control group test did not account for the fact that the privilege protects "not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act
on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him
to give sound and informed advice."'6 5 The Court noted that the middle and lower level employees, who were not in control of the corporation's response to legal advice, were the very individuals who had
66
the relevant information needed by the corporation's attorney. If
lower echelon employees were not covered by the attorney-client
privilege, the very purpose of the privilege would be frustrated by
discouraging the communication of information to the attorney who
must advise the corporate client.6 7 The Court noted, moreover, that a
proper privilege should be sufficiently clear for lawyers to rely upon,
and therefore rejected the control group test because it produced divergent court decisions as to which officers actually constituted the
control group.6 8
Chief Justice Burger, concurring in part, stated that the Court
should have offered a more precise rule: namely that "a communication [be] privileged . . .when . . . an employee or former employee
speaks at the direction of the management with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct within the scope of employment." 6 9
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 387-88.
Id. at 388.
United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1228 n.13.
449 U.S. at 390 (citations omitted).
Id. at 391.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 403.
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The Court decided the case on its facts, however, and chose not to
formulate such a general rule. As a result, it is unknown whether the
Court would apply the scope of employment test in a different factual setting. 0
Computer programmers and other computer servicers are unlikely to be considered "clients" under any of these approaches to
the attorney-client privilege. Since the computer personnel will generally program the computer with information received from others,
corporate counsel would be unlikely to seek substantive information
from them, obviating the need for a privilege. The transfer of client
communications to data processing personnel, however, may be significant, since it appears that in order for communications to be protected by the privilege, those communications must be cloaked in
some degree of confidentiality. 71 Thus, the Upjohn case remains relevant to the inquiry into the effects of data processing on the attorney-client privilege.
4. The Effect of Data Processingon the Attorney-Client Privilege.-The use of word processing and other computer technology in
the preparation, storage and communication of client materials requires the involvement of third party computer technicians and service personnel. Such personnel may be employees of the client, as in
the case of an in-house law department with a data processing staff;
persons under contract with the law firm or corporation, as in
timesharing arrangements; or persons even more remotely connected
to the work, such as outside maintenance vendors. Any of these personnel may obtain access to confidential client communications in
the course of their ordinary duties or as a result of an unauthorized
search of the files. 72 In this regard, data processing personnel may be
analogous to the eavesdropper or innocent overhearer.
As previously noted, Wigmore's treatise suggests that if a third
party overhears or steals the contents of attorney-client communication, that third party may testify as to what he or she learned.7 1
Thus, it is conceivable that computer technicians who obtain access
70.
(1982).

71.

See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M.

BERGER, WEINsrEIN's EVIDENCE

503(b)[04], at 503-55

See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.

72. Sabotage and theft of information by malcontent employees is occurring. See generally Espionage in the Computer Business, Bus. W., July 28, 1975, at 60; Hoyt, The Computer
as a Target for Industrial Spy, I ASSETS PROTECTION 41 (Spring 1975). Financial institutions
are the most obvious targets of the computer criminal. See Sokolik, Computer Crime - The
Need for Deterrent Legislation, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 353 (1980).
73. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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to confidential communications may be free to testify regarding the
communication they obtained. There are, however, several theories
to prevent such a result.
As already noted, for example, the modern trend appears to be
toward a "reasonable precautions" standard. 4 In addition, there are
several important limitations upon the general rule that disclosure to
third parties constitutes a waiver of the privilege. One key focus of
the analysis must be to determine whether data processing personnel
are analogous to any of the other third party exceptions that have
been carved out by the courts: experts who facilitate attorney-client
communications; 75 functionaries who are necessary to the communication; 76 or confidential agents who are under a duty to maintain the
confidentiality of the disclosures made by the principal. 1 In short,
adequate theories exist to afford increased coverage of the attorneyclient privilege for data processing personnel. The advantages and
drawbacks of each of these approaches will be analyzed below.
a. Reasonable Precautions.-Themodern trend is toward protecting the attorney-client privilege if reasonable precautions have
been taken to prevent loss of the confidentiality of the communications. 78 Unlike the Wigmore analysis, 79 this theory does not hold the
client strictly liable for disclosures, but, instead, adopts an approach
similar to negligence.
There are problems, of course, with utilizing any standard based
on reasonableness. Foremost is the difficulty of developing a clear
test on anything but a case-by-case basis.80 Reasonableness as a concept permeates the Uniform Commercial Code for the purpose of
facilitating day-to-day business operations.8 ' A similar approach
could be implemented for determining the prudent use of the computer by the legal practitioner. Although the reasonable person standard has worked well in negligence theory, its use in the computer
74.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 209, at 529-30 (1978).
76. Id. at 530-31.
77. id.
78. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
79. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2325 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
80. The United States Supreme Court, in Upjohn Co. v. United States, specifically emphasized the need for clarity in defining the attorney-client privilege. 449 U.S. 383, 392-93
(1981). For a further discussion of Upjohn, see supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
81. U.C.C. 2-205 (reasonableness as to time); 2-302 (reasonable opportunity to present
evidence); 2-606 (reasonable opportunity to inspect); 2-706 (reasonable manner for resale); 9207 (reasonable care of collateral); 9-504 (reasonable preparation or processing of collateral);
9-507 (sale in commerically reasonable manner) (1981).

75. See 2 D.
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context requires a certain amount of technical sophistication on the
part of the client that is probably unrealistic. In a non-computer
world it may be entirely reasonable to expect the client simply to
assure himself that he and his attorney are alone in the office, or to
presume that a file room in which any written client communications
are kept is locked. It is, however, beyond the capacity of most clients
to inquire as to what steps are being taken to preserve the confidentiality of computer files, even assuming that the client is aware that
the attorney has a computer file system. Requiring certain "reasonable precautions" in utilizing computers might also have ramifications
on the attorney's duty not to disclose client secrets and confidential
communications, which should not be lightly ignored by the attorney
establishing a law office for the twenty-first century."2 The imprecision with which these precautions are defined may "chill" communications if computers become readily used to store sensitive materials.
Notwithstanding these problems, the "reasonable precautions"
approach provides a basis for protecting the attorney-client privilege
where data processing personnel are involved. Under this approach,
the attorney, rather than the client, is likely to be primarily responsible for assuring that reasonable precautions are taken; the attorney,
of course, is in a better position to control the data processing persons' use of sensitive files. The client should reasonably expect that
his attorney will exercise adequate care to protect the confidential
communications from unnecessary disclosure. In fact, lawyers have
ethical obligations to exercise due care in maintaining their clients'
confidences. 3 In part III of this article, specific recommendations
are offered to guide lawyers in assuring that adequate care is taken
with respect to storing confidential materials in computers.
b. TraditionalExceptions to the Non-Disclosure to Third Parties Rule.-Whether data processing personnel can be brought
within the attorney-client privilege as experts who facilitate attorney-client communications, or as functionaries, is not free from
doubt. Yet, classifying them as such would eliminate the uncertainty
inherent in the reasonable precautions approach.
It is unlikely that data processing personnel would be classified
as "experts" facilitating attorney-client communications. Experts are
typically those who actually assist the lawyers in understanding or
82.

See infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.

83. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-3 (1980); see infra notes
154-64 and accompanying text.
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formulating their clients' cases, such as doctors or accountants."' In
contrast, data processing personnel merely assist after the communications between lawyer and client have occurred. Computer personnel do not facilitate the actual communication or assist in analysis,
but merely assist in the ultimate memorialization of the
communications.
Data processing personnel are more appropriately covered by
the functionary exception. 5 In order to come within the parameters
of this exception, a person must generally assist the attorney in effectively handling his clients' affairs.86 Data processing personnel fit
nicely into this category. Furthermore, this exception offers clear
guidelines for both the attorney and the client and would be unlikely
to have a chilling effect on communications as would the reasonable
precautions standard. 7
Differences between the functions performed by traditional
functionaries such as legal secretaries, and those performed by data
processing personnel, create some risk that courts will refuse to classify computer employees under the functionary exception. The secretary or clerk acts within a zone of confidentiality in which there is an
expectation that, because of the clerk's intimate involvement in the
communication, privacy or secrecy will be maintained. In contrast,
the main function of data processing personnel is operating and
maintaining the computer hardware and software; they are not generally concerned with the actual contents of the data base except for
storage purposes. In the course of their maintenance, however, data
processing people must have access to data bases, permitting them to
search for and read documents that a secretary, clerk, or other mere
computer "user" might be unable to access because of a security
system permitting access only through the use of special codes. 8 It is
unlikely that a data processing organization could function effectively if it were not authorized to access certain information or data
bases. More importantly, it would be practically impossible to actually deny access to certain files when skilled computer technicians
have the ability to juggle the codes and gain access.
Although data processing personnel can thus be distinguished
84.
85.
86.

See supra text accompanying note 42.
See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
Id.

87. For a discussion of the reasonable precautions standard and its chilling effect, see
supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 189-99 and accompanying text.
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from the secretary, file clerk, or telephone operator, the similarities
among all of these personnel are far more important with respect to
the issue of attorney-client privilege than are the differences. All perform routine tasks, during the course of which some or all of a communication may be overheard or read. Unfortunately, regardless of
how ideally suited the functionary exception may be, the issue simply has not yet surfaced in any reported cases. Since many courts
believe that privileges work in derogation of the search for truth,
they may be reluctant to extend this exception to data processing
personnel.89
c. Agency.-Agency concepts may also provide a theory to afford protection to attorney-client communications that are accessible
to data processing persons. Agency is a fiduciary relationship
whereby one party consents to have another party act on its behalf
and subject to its control.Y0 Generally, the relationship of principal
and agent is created by agreement.9 An agent can be appointed to
do the same acts and to achieve the same legal consequences as its
principal could have performed or achieved, unless the agreement
violates public policy or the conduct to be performed is criminal or
tortious.92 Agency concepts are particularly relevant to this inquiry
because agents are subject to an obligation of confidentiality apart
from the attorney-client setting: An agent is under a duty not to
furnish to others, or to use itself, either for the purpose of acquiring
property or doing any other act in opposition to the principal's interest, any information given to the agent in confidence by the principal
or acquired by the agent in the course of, or on account of, the
93
agency.
In the case of an in-house corporate legal department where the
data processing personnel are employees of the corporation, it can be
readily argued that such personnel are either agents of the corporation-"the client"--or of the legal department-"the attorney."
These personnel assist corporate attorneys in storing communications
between those attorneys and the corporation and are often required
to sign employment agreements that may be found to invoke the con89. See Saltzburg, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation and
Similar Cases: Garner Revisited, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817 (1984); Louisell, Confidentiality,
Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 109-10
(1956).
90. 3 Am. JUR. 2d Agency §§ 1, 17 (1962).
91. Id. at § 17.

92. Id. at § 20.
93. Id. at § 225.
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fidentiality obligations of an agent. Moreover, at least in the area of
tort liability, such persons are often found to be the agents of the

corporation.94 Similarly, data processors working for a law firm may
also be viewed as agents of the attorney. They certainly are subject
to the management and control of the managing partners, at a minimum, and may be subject to the actual control of the lawyer on the
case.
Of course, from a strict standpoint, it would probably have to be

argued that the relationships involve implied agency. This is especially true with respect to outside service organizations, such as

maintenance vendors and timesharing operators, who are one step
further removed from the attorney-client relationship than is the in-

house data processing department. Law firms and business enterprises that are too small to have their own data processing departments often utilize computer timesharing agreements in which vari-

ous customers utilize the computer systems of a company from their
own place of business through the use of telephone facilities." Confi-

dentiality of attorney-client communications is required, of course, in
both the timesharing arrangement and the service organization's

computer maintenance agreement with a law firm or other business.
The question becomes whether the outside service organization or
timesharing business can be construed as the agent of the law firm or

corporate legal department for the limited purpose of maintaining
the confidentiality and secrets contained on computer data bases. In
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 216, 217A (1958).
95. Even companies involved in the business of selling computer time may face problems
in maintaining the confidentiality of their computer-stored data. In the case of Com. Share,
Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., two companies were involved in the business of selling computer time on a "time sharing" basis where customers could use the computer system concurrently and pay only for the actual time they used the computer system. The companies had
entered into a "Technical Exchange Agreement" where the "plaintiff supplied to defendant, in
confidence, . . . information, training, know how, documents, tapes, tangible things and other
technology developed by plaintiff." 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1231 (E.D. Mich.), aqf'd, 48 F.2d 134
(6th Cir. 1972). The agreement specified that the parties "agreed not to lease, sell or otherwise
divulge to any third party interest, without the prior written consent of the other, any and all
systems software developments supplied to it by the other." Id. at 1232. The parties terminated the agreement after three and one half years by mutual agreement. Nine months later,
the defendant announced plans to sell substantially all of its assets and goodwill related to its
computer time sharing operations to a third party who was a competitor of the plaintiff. Id.
The plaintiff then filed a motion for preliminary and permanent equitable relief. Id. Noting,
inter alia, the use of notices in the software and the use of passwords, the court found that
"the utmost caution was used by plaintiff in protecting the secrecy of this software." Consequently, the court granted the motion for equitible relief and protected the information against
disclosure. Id. at 1234.

94.
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the current evolutionary state of maintenance and time-sharing contracts, it is unclear whether an express agency relationship will exist,
especially with regard to the narrow issue of confidentiality.
In addition, the outside service organization or timesharing business may contract with an enterprise to maintain the enterprise's
own computer equipment or to afford the enterprise computer time
to process its business data. Although such a service organization
may be viewed as an independent contractor rather than an agent
because the service organization is not controlled by the person with
whom it contracts,98 independent contractors have been classified as
agents. 7 The best view is that, by exchanging obligations of confidentiality as to the proprietary and confidential information each
contractual party may be exposed to, a fiduciary relationship is created between the parties for the limited purposes of ensuring the
confidentiality of this information.
d. The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege.-In the corporate
context, it could be argued that communications between corporate
counsel and corporate employees should lose their otherwise privileged status because data processing personnel have access to these
communications. However, under the approach suggested by Judge
Weinstein's treatise on evidence, one of the relevant factors to consider is whether access to the attorney-client communications was
limited solely to those employees who needed to know the contents of
the communications."8 Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly adopt this standard in Upjohn Co. v. United States,99 the Court
did note that "[p]ursuant to explicit instructions . . . the communications were considered 'highly confidential' when made, . . . and

00
have been kept confidential by the company."
Utilizing this "need to know" theory, those seeking to assert the
privilege may argue that the involvement of data processing personnel in the transmission of communications by computer, the storage
of such information, and the maintenance of both hardware and
software systems requires that such personnel know a limited
amount of confidential information within the scope of their employ-

96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1958).
97. Id. See also 41 Am. Jur. 2d Independent Contractors § 3 (1968).
98, 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 1 503(b)[04] (1981). See
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (rehearing en banc)
(the court adopted the Weinstein approach).
99. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
100. Id. at 395 (footnote and citations omitted).
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ment. In diagnosing system malfunctions, technicians may have to

access the confidential file in which the malfunction occurred. Additionally, in order to protect against accidental or purposeful destruction of files, both confidential and ordinary files must be copied and
stored. In each of these instances, data processing people have the
potential for purposefully or inadvertantly reading confidential files.
Although the data processor merely requires access to the file, and
not necessarily knowledge of its contents, such access should be sufficient to meet the "need to know" standard. If the communication is
otherwise cloaked in secrecy, as the Court noted was done in
Upjohn,101 the communication should not lose its privileged status
merely because computer workers may have access to it.
e. General Accessibility of Files.-An issue related to a computer employee's access to confidential information is whether the
failure to segregate confidential files, either apart from the computer
files, or in a separate file, is itself a waiver of the privilege.
Although there is little authority on the issue, one federal district court, in James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 0 2 held that certain privileged memoranda written by corporate counsel did not lose
their confidential status because they were placed in a general
corporate file.' 0 3 In reaching this conclusion, the court began its
analysis at the time the documents were compiled. The court
stressed the confidential treatment of the documents at the time of
and subsequent to their composition, noting that in Upjohn'04 the
Court had stressed that the documents were "considered 'highly confidential' when made . . . and have been kept confidential by the

company."' 0 5 The Raytheon court then looked at the number of
company personnel with authorized access, noting that "[t]he presence of nonessential third parties not needed for the transmittal of
the information will negate the privilege."'' 0
The Raytheon court found that the distribution of the documents was both "reasonable and necessary" in that all those who
received copies had a status that indicated that it was "essential that
they know the contents of the memorandum."' 107 The court then pro101.

Id.

102. 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982).
103. Id. at 142.
104. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
105. 93 F.R.D. at 141. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. at 395).
106. 93 F.R.D. at 141 (citing Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444, 446 (S.D.
Fla. 1980)).
107. 93 F.R.D. at 141 (citation omitted).
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ceeded to the question of whether the documents, marked "company
private" and filed in the general corporate project file, lost their confidential status because the file was open to employees working on
the particular project file.108 The party arguing that the documents
had been published and the corporate attorney-client privilege thus
waived cited the recent case of Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy.10 9 In Coastal, the Department of Energy ("DOE")
had opposed the disclosure of certain documents under exemption 5
of the Freedom of Information Act, arguing that the documents
were protected by the attorney-client privilege."10 The Coastal court
held that DOE had waived the privilege because it could not demonstrate that it had treated the documents in a confidential manner."'
The Raytheon court concluded, however, that Coastal was distinguishable because the documents in Raytheon, unlike those in
Coastal, "were not broadly circulated or used as training materials;
they were simply indexed and placed in the appropriate file where
they would be available to those corporate employees who needed
them."' 1 2 As the court had pointed out in Coastal, it is only when
facts have been made known to persons other than those who need to
know them that confidentiality is destroyed."13 The Raytheon court
also distinguished Coastal by noting that the Coastalcourt had written its decision prior to Upjohn, which rejected the "control group
test" that Coastal had used. 1 4 The Raytheon court concluded as
follows:
[Tihe fact that some unauthorized corporatepersonnel may purposely or inadvertently read a privileged document does not render
that document nonconfidential. To hold otherwise would be to require every corporation to maintain at least two sets of files. Moreover, a screening committee would then have to be set up whereby
some designated official could pass on the need of each employee to
know the contents of any requested document. Such a system is
neither
15 practical nor in the Court's opinion required by the case

law. 1
108.
109.
110.
II.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 142.
617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Id. at 862.
Id, at 863-64.
93 F.R.D. at 142.
617 F.2d at 863.
93 F.R.D. at 142.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The reasoning of the court in Raytheon may be applicable to
files kept in a computer maintained or controlled by outside service
organizations only where these organizations are considered agents,
either implied or because of express confidentiality obligations made
by the organization, which would give them the status of agents for
these limited purposes. Such an arrangement would show the client's
intent to maintain confidentiality. The use of outside organizations
for the maintenance or storage of computer data bases places the
need to maintain confidentiality one step further removed from the
situation in Raytheon, as personnel other than the corporation's employees will have access to the confidential information. Consequently, the most important aspect of Raytheon may be the fact that
it raised, rather than truly answered, the question of what happens
when confidential documents are filed with general corporate
documents.
Absent the adoption of one or more of the above theories to
sustain the attorney-client privilege, counsel may wish to carefully
consider the ramifications of using data processing for storage and
transmission of client communications. As we suggest later in this
article, however, there are several steps that can be taken by both
the attorney and the client to assist in maintaining the privilege.
B.

Work Product Doctrine
11
The work product doctrine, enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor, 6
provides a qualified privilege against disclosure for materials prepared by the attorney in anticipation of litigation. Although related
to the attorney-client privilege, it differs in that the attorney is the
holder of the privilege and it is a "qualified" privilege. Despite the
highly sensitive or confidential nature of the information contained
in the documents, they are discoverable if the moving party can show
"substantial need" or "undue hardship.""'1 In some instances, the
116.
117.

329 U.S. 495 (1947).
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part:

Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision
(b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case
and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of

the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the
required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the

mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
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work product doctrine can afford broader protection than the attorney-client privilege because disclosure to others may not constitute
waiver. Disclosure to those who are not "clients," for example, does
not constitute waiver. The doctrine was intended to create a "zone of
privacy" within which the attorney may think, plan, weigh facts and
legal theories, and prepare the case.118 This policy can be satisfied by
less than complete secrecy; therefore, disclosure of work product documents will not constitute waiver unless the disclosure is inconsistent
with maintaining the secrecy from the possible or actual
adversary.11 9
To be protected, the document or materials must have been prepared "in anticipation of litigation," which can be somewhat difficult
to show. Generally, opinion or mental impression work product prepared by counsel will be immune from discovery, 2 0 at least in part
because of its inherent lack of reliability as evidence. In contrast,
materials or documents prepared for counsel involve less of an intrusion into an attorney's privacy and thus are more susceptible to discovery. Some courts will strictly enforce the work product doctrine
with a few limited exceptions. 2 ' Other courts balance the amount of
opinion work contained in the requested material against the re22
questing party's need for the information.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure protect work product
materials from discovery unless the discovering party shows: (1) substantial need and (2) inability "without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent" by other means. 123 Once this showing is
made, "ordinary" work product can be discovered; yet "opinion"
work product, "the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney" or other party concerning litigation may
still be protectable1 24 With increased use of data processing equiprepresentative of a party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
118. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 864 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
119. Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 338 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
120. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 732 (4th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975).
121. See, e.g., Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal.
1976).
122. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970),
aff'd, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 513 (1947).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol12/iss4/2

22

Soma and Youngs: Confidential Communications and Information in a Computer Era
19841

CONFIDENTIALITY AND COMPUTERS

ment for document creation, the potential for having work product
information stored on computer data banks is perhaps even greater
than it is for the storage of attorney-client privilege material. However, there is no plausible reason why the work product doctrine
should not be applicable to information stored in a computer.
One possible way to protect work product from discovery is to
insert a code or comment involving opinion or strategy, to elevate the
work from ordinary work product to opinion work product and
thereby increase its chances of not being discovered. That approach
can be challenged, however, and may not be upheld. The better approach, which appears well suited for information stored in a computer, is to meet the issue directly and argue that legal theories are
inherently and inextricably woven into the data.'25
It may be necessary, even under that approach, to let the court
review the data in camera, and the non-opinion portions may then be
discoverable. In fact, due to the ability of a computer to excise critical portions, a court may be more willing to tolerate fishing expeditions into work product stored in a computer.
At least one court has suggested that a document containing an
attorney's mental impressions that cannot be separated from the factual content is obtainable, so long as the requesting party meets the
requirements of Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 26 This reasoning could be countered by the Hickman admonition that only a "rare situation" can justify intruding into the attorney's mental impressions. 12 7 Counsel should insist on an in camera
review of the documents to glean the factual material that would
1 28
then be furnished to the discovering party.
Federal civil procedure rules permit the discovery of computer
records in readable form (printouts), just as manual records are discoverable. 29 But in IBM PeripheralsEDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 30 where the plaintiffs wished to compel the use of the defendant's document retrieval system in answering interrogatories as to
the identity of certain documents, the court ruled that there had
125.
1970); In
126.
127.

See generally Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.
re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977).
Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 513.

128. See Johnston, A Guide for the Proponent and Opponent of Computer-Based Evidence, I Computer L. J. 667, 687 (1979).
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
'130. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, No. 163-RM (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 10, 1975). (available Sept. 21, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
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been no showing of substantial need, that the material had been
placed in the data base in anticipation of litigation, and that such
information was still available by other means. 131 The judge also
noted the defendant's argument that the discovering party would
also learn which key documents and words the defendant considered
significant, thus permitting the party to learn some of the defendant
attorney's mental impressions.13 2
Work product materials will not be rendered discoverable in all
cases simply because the material has been placed in a data base,
and no party should be compelled to give the discovering party total
access to its system. Rather, discovery must be limited to specific
documents and specific information, and the discovering party must
make the required showing of substantial need.
C.

Other Testimonial Privileges.

1. Accountant-Client.-The accountant-client privilege is entirely a creation of state statute. The common law rule is that no
privilege attaches to the transactions between an accountant and client absent a statute creating a privilege. 133 Federal law does not recognize an accountant's privilege,13 4 nor will a state-created privilege
be recognized in a federal criminal trial.13 5
Where an attorney is acting as an accountant, courts have not
only failed to find an accountant's privilege, but have held that any
client-accountant transaction does not bring the communications
131. Id.
132. Id. A computer litigation support system may be subject to discovery since this
system is merely a tool used by the attorney to code documents based on objective indexing
methods and is, therefore, discoverable as ordinary work product just as any other manual file
system would be. Because a party may discover "the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents or tangibles," FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), the
owner of a computer support system should be able to claim no more privilege than the owner
of a manual file system because the owner of the computer-stored information can also reduce
the computer-stored information to "hardcopy" form. Further, there are no subjective thought
processes in this type of index system that would arguably make this information "opinion"
work product. Unless the documents are indexed by a method that might reveal the attorney's
thought processes or strategy - perhaps indexing by legal issues - this material could be
discoverable.
133. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 1949). For an example
of a statutorily created accountant-client privilege, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(0
(1973); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-2-1-23 (West 1980); NEv. REv. STAT. § 49.185 (1979).
134. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973); United States v. Wainwright,
413 F.2d 796, 803 (10th Cir. 1969); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
135. United States v. Culver, 224 F. Supp. 419, 434 (D. Md. 1963).
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within the attorney-client privilege.1 36 An accountant who has been
hired by an attorney may or may not be able to invoke the attorney-

client privilege on the theory that the accountant was the attorney's
agent. In United States v. Kovel, 13 7 the court held that the attorneyclient privilege was applicable to an accountant in the attorney's em-

ploy if the communication was made for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice. 138 In Himmelfarb v. United States,'30 the court stated

that where the presence of a third person is indispensable to the
communications between attorney and client, the privilege may be

invoked.140 The Himmelfarb court held that in that case the accountant's presence was not indispensable, but was merely a conve41

nience that effectively waived the confidentiality of the privilege.1
Those statutes that recognize the accountant-client privilege do
so on the same basis as the attorney-client privilege.' 4 2 The account-

ant-client communication must be made in the course of professional
employment and may generally include under its umbrella the ac-

countant's stenographer, clerk, secretary or assistant. 143 The Nevada

statute defines a confidential communication as one that is "not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom

disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional account136. United States v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 420, 426 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Application of
Roe, 319 F. Supp. 990, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 16 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).
137. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
138. Id. at 921-22.
139. 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949).
140. Id. at 939.
141. Id. This reasoning is critically important to the issue of whether disclosure of confidential communications to a data processing employee or outside service organization employee constitutes waiver. By this court's reasoning, if the computer technician's presence is
"merely a convenience" rather than indispensable to facilitating attorney-client communications, the privilege will be deemed waived. The answer that any particular court may give to
this question may be based on policy considerations revolving around testimonial privileges, as
well as the court's view of technological innovation and its integration into the legal system.
142. Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.095 (1979) (attorney-client privilege) with NEv.
REV. STAT. § 49.185 (1979) (accountant-client privilege). The statutes are identical in most
relevant aspects.
143. Colorado law provides:
A certified public accountant shall not be examined without the consent of his client
as to any communication made by the client to him in person or through the media
of books of account and financial records, or his advice, reports, or working papers
given or made thereon in the course of professional employment; nor shall a secretary, stenographer,clerk, or assistantof a certifiedpublic accountant be examined
without the consent of the client concerning any fact, the knowledge of which he has
acquired in such capacity.
COLO. Rav. STAT. § 13-90-107(f) (1973) (emphasis added).
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ing services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication." 4
Because of the nature of the work, it is likely that an accountant's work product will be stored in a computer. Consequently, the
accountant will probably encounter the same problems with the accountant-client privilege as an attorney will with the attorney-client
privilege. Given the similarity of the two privileges, the accountant
should be able to make the same arguments as the attorney in maintaining the confidentiality of computer files, and courts should treat
the two privileges similarly with regard to what will constitute a
waiver of the confidentiality of the computer-stored data.
2. Other Privileges.-Evidentiaryprivileges have also been extended to other relationships for substantially the same purpose as
that for which the attorney-client privilege exists. 45 The origin of
most privileges is in the common law, but many states have enacted
statutes that either codify these common law privileges or add more
unusual types of privileges to those already recognized by the common law. State statutes protect confidential communications between
psychologists or psychiatrists and patients; 46 physicians or surgeons
and patients; 4 7 clergy and penitents; 48 and accountants and clients.1 49 Other more unusual protections include: parent or legal
guardian and child; 150 pathologist or audiologist and patient;' 5 ' reporter and informant; 52 juvenile or probation officer and client; 53
and teacher or school counselor and pupil. 54 These privileges generally require that the communication be made privately and that it
144. NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.155 (1979).
145. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
146. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28.1001, Rule 503 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503
(West 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (Supp. 1984).
147. See, e.g., Id.; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 4 §§ 49.21549.245 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2503 (West 1980).
148. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Rule 505 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505
(1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 4 § 49.255 (1981); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (Supp. 1975).
149. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(0 (1973); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-2-1-23
(West 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.195 (1979).
150. See, e.g., 2 IDAHO CODE § 9-203(7) (Supp. 1983); 38 MINN. STAT. ANN. §
595.02(9) (Supp. 1984).
151. See, e.g., 4 MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-806 (1983).
152. See, e.g., 4A ARIz. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982); 11 ALA. CODE § 12-21-142
(1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (West 1983).
153. See, e.g., Judicial Vol. 1 N.M. STAT. ANN. Judicial Pamphlet 10, Rule 509 (1983).
154. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-809 (1983); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(6) (Supp.

1983).
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not be intended for further disclosure except to other persons in furtherance of the purpose of the communication. It would thus appear
that the same arguments and problems exist with respect to these
privileges as exist for the attorney-client privilege.

If maintaining confidential communications in computers automatically results in a waiver of the confidential and privileged status
of the communications due to the presence of third party data

processing personnel, the shock waves will reach far beyond the law
office. This will be especially true as more institutions - legal, governmental, educational, and medical - utilize the efficiency of the
computer. In the face of widespread computer usage, it is inconceiv-

able that public policy could best be served by destroying the very
basis on which these special relationships exist.
D. ProfessionalResponsibility and Computer Confidentiality.

The principle of confidentiality is relevant not only in regard to
testimonial privileges, but also in regard to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.' 5 5 Ethical Consideration 4-3 states that:
Unless the client otherwise directs, it is not improper for a lawyer
to give limited information from his files to an outside agency necessary for statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing,
banking, printing, or other legitimate purposes, provided he exercises due care in the selection of the agency and warns the agency
that the information must be kept confidential.' 5 6
This Ethical Consideration is clearly applicable to the situation

wherein an outside service organization is employed by a corporation
155. The American Bar Association adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969 and it became effective on January 1, 1970. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980). The Code was "designed to be adopted by appropriate agencies both as an inspirational guide to members of the profession and as a basis for disciplinary
action when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the required minimum standards stated in the
Disciplinary Rules." Id. at Preliminary Statement.
Although the Model Code of Professional Responsibility has been replaced by the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, the new Model Rules have not yet been widely adopted. New
York Times, Aug. 3, 1983, at Al, col. 1. The Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes

a lawyer "to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980). Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A) makes clear that the Canon en-

compasses more than privileged information:
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under
applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A).
156. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-3 (1980).
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or law firm to maintain its computer equipment. Although the Ethical Considerations are not mandatory, and merely represent objectives toward which members of the profession should strive, 157 the
Disciplinary Rules ("DR")15 provide: "A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, associates and others whose
services are utilized by him from disclosing or using confidences or
secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may reveal the information
allowed by DR 4-101(C) through an employee." 5 9 Rule 4-101(D)
seems to indicate that the attorney's duty would not be violated by
engaging the services of an outside organization's computer technicians even though this might involve allowing access to a client's
confidential information, as long as the attorney used reasonable
care to prevent disclosure. It would also seem that the maintenance
of computers is less likely to involve access to confidential files than
the situations envisioned by the Rules and Ethical Consideration.
Outside data processing firms, however, would be intimately involved
in manipulating client information provided by the law firm, rather
than merely servicing software or hardware that might involve the
computer technician's use of a confidential file.
The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility,'60 in issuing an informal opinion,'"'
questioned whether a law firm had a duty to inform the client that it
was using a data processing firm." 2 The committee assumed that the
information that would be provided to the service bureau would include client identification information involving client numbers, client names, detailed descriptive information, involving work performed by the attorney on specified dates, concerning particular
matters for identified clients, financial information, and documents
157.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1980).

158. Disciplinary Rules, unlike Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character and
set forth minimum levels of conduct which all lawyers must reach or face disciplinary action.
Id.
159.
160.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(D) (1980).
The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional

Responsibility, composed of eight practitioners who are elected by majority vote of the American Bar Association's members, is charged with the duty of interpreting the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. I ABA CoMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS 5 (1975).
161. Informal Opinions are issued by the Committee in response to specific inquiries
from individual members of the ABA. The Committee also issues Formal Opinions, which are
issued to deal with matters of general interest in the profession. Id.

162.

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1364 (1976).
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being prepared by computerized word processing. 6 3 The committee
stated that "the use of outside agencies for statistical, bookkeeping,
accounting, data processing, banking, printing, and other legitimate
purposes is comparable to the use of employees and associates and,
accordingly, is embraced within" Disciplinary Rule 4-101(D).
In reviewing plans to set up a private agency that would provide
off-site word processing and retrieval for attorneys, the committee
stressed that its philosophy was to interpret ethical standards so as to
permit the use of modern business practices, stating that:
[1]t really makes no difference as to whether or not the contemplated data processing was done in the law office by an employee or
in the place of business of the data processor. The key is that whoever it is that is handling the material, whether or not he is a formal employee of the law firm or an employee of a contractual
agent of the law firm, must preserve the confidences of the
client .... 164
The committee thus concluded that there would be no ethical
code violation in not informing a client that a data processing firm
was being used so long as the arrangements were made in such a
manner "that the material be kept in confidence and the employees
of the law firm and the data processor do so keep them in confidence
and do not permit disclosure to any unauthorized person. ' ' 16 5 The
committee formulated a four part test to determine whether the attorney had taken due care in choosing the agency to which limited
information was to be given: "1. the appropriate selection of the
agency; 2. the appropriate rules within the agency for the preservation of secrecy; 3. the appropriate warning to the agency; 4. the ability of the agency to keep its matters secret."'16 6
67
Although these opinions are not binding on code enforcers
and reflect professional and ethical concerns rather than legal standards for the maintenance of evidentiary privileges, the opinions offer enlightenment as to what might be considered reasonable con163.

Id.

164. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1127 (1970).
165. Id. at 337.
166. Id.
167. Lawyers are disciplined by appropriate state and local bar associations, acting
through the local courts or under the rules of those courts. Since each state has enacted its
own rules of professional conduct that regulate its lawyers, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the opinions issued interpreting the Code, will not be directly enforceable
in any state. AMERICAN BAR ASsOCIATION, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS 15-17 (1978).
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duct on the part of an attorney to maintain privileges in the face of
new methods and systems of information storage. 168 Thus, the reasonable conduct or due care of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility might be used in part to flesh out the meaning of "reasonable precautions" when the term is used by courts, such as in In
re Grand Jury ProceedingsInvolving Berkley and Co., Inc., 69 in determining the privileged status of attorney-client information.
The key to the lawyer's responsibility in handling confidential
client information would appear to be found in EC 4-3's requirements of due care in the selection of an agency and the notice or
warning to the agency that the information must remain confidential. These considerations point toward the use of confidentiality or
non-disclosure agreements signed by the agency. Due care may also
involve an inquiry into the agency's rules for maintaining secrecy.
Consequently, in making a decision as to whether to place confidential client information on computer data bases, the attorney may
have a duty to inform the client of the possibility of the waiver of a
privilege because of the disclosure to an outside agency and permit
the client to decide whether to assume the risk of waiver or disclosure. This procedure would be in keeping with the theory that the
possesses the right to
privilege belongs to the client, who ultimately
70
either claim the privilege or waive it.1
III.

CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION

The nature of certain confidential business information is such
that it remains valuable only so long as the information remains secret. Once confidential business information is disclosed, its value to
168.
169.
170.

Id.
466 F. Supp. 863, 869 (D. Minn. 1979).
The new Model Rules of Professional Conduct take essentially the same approach

as did the Model Code of Professional Responsibility with respect to the disclosure of confidential information to employees. Rule 5.3 states:

With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the profes-

sional obligations of the lawyer...
Rule 5.3.
The comment to this rule states: "[a] lawyer should give [employees] appropriate instruction and supervision . . . particularly regarding the obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client. . ." Id. Thus, the Model Rules, as does the Model Code,
appear to allow disclosure of confidential client information to employees as long as the attorney takes reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure. However, it would appear that as a
minimum, the Model Rules require some sort of instructions to employees regarding their duty
not to disclose confidential information before the "reasonable efforts" standard can be met.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
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the holder of the information is lost: the holder no longer will have
the competitive advantage that the information provided. Maintaining the confidentiality of certain business information is as important
to its holder as maintaining confidences is to the holder of one of the
other testimonial privileges. The difference, however, is one of protecting information as opposed to protecting communications.'7 '
Business information protected by a patent or copyright may be
disclosed without risk of losing the value of the information. Patents
and copyrights are protected only for a statutory period,'17 2 however,
and it may be desirable to achieve longer protection. If a company
wishes to use the information for its own competitive advantage
rather than disseminate the information, it can be protected only by
keeping the information as a trade secret. 73
The term "trade secret" is defined by the Restatement of Torts
"Restatement" as
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it...
It differs from other secret information in a business in that it is
not simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business, as for example, the amount or other terms of
a secret bid for a contract or the salary of certain employees ...
A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the oper-

ation of the business ....

174

The term trade secret has been further defined as information that is
75
secret, novel and has value.
The following discussion examines whether disclosure of a trade
secret to data processing personnel constitutes an abandonment of
secrecy, thus causing the information to lose its status as a trade
171. When confidential business information is made available to an attorney for the
purposes of representation, it should not lose status as a trade secret, nor its status as being
within the attorney-client privilege. Presuming that the law firm or the corporate law department is enforcing strict controls over computer access in order to maintain the higher standards of attorney-client nondisclosure, the trade information existing in the data banks should
not lose its trade secret status.
172. The constitutional basis for federal patent protection is found in U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 8. See, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1977), for patent statutes and 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 for copyright statutes.

173.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

174. Id.
175. 9A
(1982).

Z.

§ 757 comment b, at 5 (1939).

CAUITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING
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secret. Although secrecy is a fundamental element of a trade secret,
absolute secrecy is not required to maintain the privilege of non-disclosure. Courts have recognized that only a "substantial element" of
secrecy is required.' 76 A limited disclosure for a restricted purpose
does not, therefore, ordinarily result in an abandonment of the element of secrecy. 17 7 Moreover, courts have held that the existence of
confidential circumstances surrounding the disclosure
of a trade se17
cret tends to negate the abandonment of secrecy. 1
The Restatement states that it is not required that only the proprietor of the business have knowledge of the secret. 17 The proprietor may disclose the trade secret to those who have been pledged to
secrecy. 801 A substantial element of secrecy must exist, however, so
that the information would be difficult to be legitimately acquired.'
Two of the factors suggested by the Restatement for determining
whether a trade secret exists are "the extent of measures taken by
[the holder] to guard the secrecy of the information," and "the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in his business. '"182

The importance of the confidential circumstances surrounding
the limited disclosure of a trade secret was recognized in United
States Plywood Corp. v. GeneralPlywood Corp.'13 In that case, the
court stated that there was no evidence of any effort on the part of a
plywood finish developer to maintain secrecy because the developer
did not require the licensees of the process to sign confidentiality
agreements. 4 Furthermore, in J.T. Healy & Son, Inc. v. James A.
Murphy & Son, Inc.,'8" where a manufacturer chose not to warn his
employees against disclosing trade secrets because of fear that treating the secret processes in a special way would excite undue interest
in those processes,"8 6 the court rejected his argument and held that
this ploy was totally contrary to the general rule that businessmen
176. See id. at § 232-33 and cases cited therein.
177,
178.

See Wilkes v. Pioneer American Ins. Co., 383 F. Supp. 1135 (D.S.C. 1974).
See, e.g., id.

179.

RESTATEMENT OF

ToRTs § 757 comment b (1939).

180. Id.
181. Id. See Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972).
182. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
183. 370 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1966). See also Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera &
Instrument, 366 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Ariz. 1973); Wheelabrator Corp. v. Fogle, 317 F. Supp.
633 (W.D. La. 1970).
184. Plywood, 370 F.2d at 508.
185. 357 Mass. 728, 260 N.E.2d 723 (1970).
186. 357 Mass. at 737, 260 N.E.2d at 730.
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must be eternally vigilant to guard the secrecy of a trade secret-preferably by warnings to employees, and the signing of confidentiality employment agreements. 81
Under the Plywood analysis, it appears that a trade secret
would not be abandoned by a business if the employees who have
access to computer data banks are operating under written obligations of confidentiality. This would be equally true of a law ftrm's
employees, where the firm's corporate client was required to turn
over certain trade secret information to the law firm. The law firm
would already be in a confidential attorney-client relationship with
the corporation, and the confidential obligations would exist in the
absence of a written agreement and would extend to the law firm's
employees under an agency theory.
Use of third party service organizations, however, may cause
the protection to be lost. Abandonment of secrecy has been established in certain cases where methods of operation and equipment
were visible because of access to manufacturing facilities through
tours. In ShatterproofGlass Corp. v. Guardian Glass,"" for example, the court noted that the glass manufacturer's customers, dealers,
distributors and others could view the glass bending operations, and,
although there was evidence of security and nonsecurity routes for
the tours, neither route was defined and those who took the tour
were not pledged to secrecy. 8 9 In Loundes Products, Inc. v.
Brower, 90° the court held that the manufacturer's trade secret was
not entitled to protection because of lax security and open access
throughout the plant by all employees.' 9 ' Such cases indicate that
the signing of confidentiality agreements by employees, standing
alone, may be insufficient to show an intent to maintain confidentiality. It is analagous to a third party service organization having full
access to computer files containing trade secret information. Such
access could be compared with the tours in ShatterproofGlass, and
thus result in a waiver of secrecy.
Therefore, to avoid such ambiguity, it is necessary to develop
clearly delineated procedures for computer access on a "need to
know" basis. These arrangements could include restricting access to
employees and outside service organizations except where computer
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

357 Mass. at 738, 260 N.E.2d at 730-31.
322 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Mich. 1970), af'd, 462 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir. 1972).
id. at 864.
259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761 (1972).
259 S.C. at 329-30, 191 S.E.2d at 765-66.
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maintenance circumstances require that a confidential data bank be
used to correct the computer problem, and requiring secrecy agreements of all persons, in-house and outside, who have access to the
computer. Indeed, the authors recommend that a manual of computer security be developed, incorporating the security procedures, in
order to demonstrate an intent to maintain the secrecy of the
information.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND SOLUTIONS

Of the various types of confidential information that have been
discussed, it would appear that the most rigorous standard for nondisclosure applies to the maintenance of the attorney-client privilege.
Consequently, if the security measures taken to guard computer data
bases are sufficiently strict to preserve the attorney-client privilege, it
should follow that those procedures would be adequate for other
privileges and trade secrets as well. The following are recommendations for maintaining the confidentiality of computer stored information that should provide sufficient protection to establish "reasonable
precautions" for preservation of the attorney-client privilege. Greater
measures may be required in a particular situation, and the lawyer
or business person should take such additional steps as are necessary
for that situation. It is also suggested that the following recommendations be incorporated into a mandatory computer security manual
for the law firm or corporation, and be adopted as firm or corporate
policy.
A.

Computer Security Procedures

As suggested by Slivka and Darrow, the security of a data system will generally depend on systems controls, physical access controls and administrative controls.192 Systems controls consist of identification, authorization, and privacy transformations. 193
The first step in implementing systems controls is to limit access
to a computer system by requiring the identification of the computer
user. This can be accomplished by allowing access only through use
of a password or log-on procedure. More complicated systems might
include a code designating a department or firm in addition to the
individual password.
192,

Slivka & Darrow, Methods and Problems in Computer Security, 5 J. Computers

& L. 217, 228 (1976). A detailed analysis of security procedures is found in this excellent
article. The categories of security procedures are suggested by this work.

193.

Id. at 229-46.
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Access can be further limited by an authorization that signifies
the functions that a user is authorized to perform within the system.
For example, a user could be allowed to perform all, only some or
none of several functions on a file. A user might be allowed to check
the information in a file, but not be allowed to alter or add to the
file. Consequently, without authorization, certain information would
not be available to all users of a system. The more complicated and
extensive the information stored in the system, the more horizontal
levels of access can be created, with the system's users capable of
attaining access only to their authorized levels. Information can also
be departmentalized in a vertical division among users and departments, so that one department cannot use another department's files
unless authorized to do so by that department. Further, the level of
authorization can be extended to control access to specific records or
even parts of records. A payroll clerk, for example, may be authorized to gain access to payroll information in a personnel file but may
not be able to gain access to performance ratings located in the same
personnel file.194
A more sophisticated system control is to use privacy transformations to protect confidential information. Privacy transformations
render data unintelligible to unauthorized inquiries and, thus, involve
a more serious and concommitantly more complicated attempt at
maintaining secrecy. Although this method is probably too expensive
and troublesome for a law firm to institute, it could be used more
realistically by a large corporation with a computer system that has
the capability of storing large amounts of corporate information.
1. Physical Controls.-Physicalcontrols to access to confidential data are linked to system controls. Unauthorized use can be
physically controlled by requiring sign-in logs, the use of key lock or
card access systems, or by placing the terminal that has sole access
to a confidential computer file in a secured room, just as confidential
manual files are often placed in a single room with limited access.
This may be difficult if a legal department or firm has placed computer terminals in all offices. In this instance, the password and code
system would have to be implemented to limit access.
With larger systems, time and location of access can be recorded for consulting at a later date. This may be particularly useful
when access is permitted by telephone modums from off-site locations, either by persons using the system or by maintenance vendors.
194.

Id. at 237.
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2. Administrative Controls.-Administrative controls assure
that personnel are informed of the proper steps to take in implementing a secure system. In a corporate setting, it is necessary for the
legal, accounting, and data processing departments to cooperate to
establish a secure system. For purposes of the attorney-client privilege, the managers of a data processing department should be informed that they and their employees are agents of the legal department for the purpose of maintaining the confidentiality of the legal
department's information contained in the computer data base. This
can be accomplished by a formal memorandum outlining the steps to
be taken to protect information prepared by the legal department
and submitted to the data processing department for storage in the
computer system. This memorandum, together with any later directives dealing with confidential files, should become part of the computer security procedures manual.
The memorandum to the head of the data processing department should outline, as a minimum, the following duties of the data
processing manager:
1. Inform employees of the obligation of confidentiality and their
status as agents of the legal department.
2. Inform vendors and maintenance personnel servicing equipment
or software programs containing legal department information that
the information is confidential, and to take such steps as necessary
to evidence knowledge of such actions as the legal department may
direct, including the signing of consent forms.
3. Prohibit access to equipment containing legal department information to all unauthorized personnel.
4. Inform the head of the legal department of any unauthorized
access, the time and date thereof, and the information affected.
5. Document, as directed by the legal department, the services performed and maintenance rendered on equipment and programs
containing legal department information.
6. Take all reasonable steps to protect the contents of tapes and
other back-up material containing legal department material that
may be delivered to third parties for off-site storage.
7. Require new data processing personnel to be adequately advised
of their obligation of confidentiality with respect to legal department information.
8. Assist the legal department in establishing special files that restrict access to authorized law department personnel.
With some modifications, this type of memorandum could also
be used for internal control by a law firm, and for purposes of in-
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forming timesharing services of their responsibilities.
B. Legal Staff Procedures
In addition to computer security procedures, it is also important
that internal procedures be established when attorney-client information is to be stored in computer data bases. The following procedures
are suggested:
1. Develop levels of accessibility, both horizontally, for certain
types of information, and vertically, as between departments, and
identify the members of each level. In a corporate setting, this
might be done by job title, according to organizational charts. In a
smaller setting, within a corporate legal department, there may be
no need to have differing levels of accessibility, with all attorneys
having equal access to confidential files. Criteria should be adopted
to identify how information/communications will receive "confidential" designation. 195
2. Documents that constitute communications to the attorney, work
product or trade secrets should be designated and their legal status
clearly reflected on the document.
3. Access to these documents should be strictly controlled by maintaining a distinct set of files for confidential documents. 9 6 This
would obviously require the attorney to designate which documents
are confidential, thus requiring special input into the separate data
bank. The log of entries into the data bank should also reflect the
confidential nature of the document.
4. Access to the confidential data base by data processing personnel
and outside service organizations, and the reasons for such access,
should be recorded by log book. Any unauthorized entries should
be immediately reported to the corporate legal department or law
firm.
195. "Need to know" access may be restricted to those employees who are members of
the decision-making group, the attorney's subordinates, and experts retained for the purpose of
assisting in legal advice. If personnel have only limited access to such confidential data banks
(i.e., access only where the specific computer difficulty involves the confidential data base, or
the creation of back-up files, or if access to such files is permitted only upon authorization
from higher level personnel or the law department), this limited and carefully supervised access should be sufficient to sustain at least the intent of the client to maintain the confidentiality of files. It should be noted that, in many instances, these employees sign confidentiality
obligations as part of their employment contracts. Further, the access to confidential computer
files by such personnel could be limited to those situations in which the system has "crashed"
during the use of the confidential file and the technician must, therefore, correct the problem
while using the sensitive file.
196. Although in James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982), see
supra notes 102-15 and accompanying text, a separate confidential file was not required, this
recommendation urges extra caution.
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5. Any hard copy of computer-stored information should, if possible, be stored separately from non-confidential files and access
should be strictly limited on the same basis as that for computer
files.
6. The authorization for data processing personnel or outside service organizations to work on confidential files should come directly
from the concerned attorney to preserve confidentiality on an
agency theory.
C.

Employment Agreements

Employment agreements are a method of placing nondisclosure
understandings in contract form. These confidentiality agreements
could be especially important in the maintenance of trade secrets because the use of such contracts would indicate the holder's intent to
maintain secrecy. Furthermore, confidentiality agreements signed by
data processing personnel could also be used to indicate a similar
intent to the court. Since employees who have knowledge of trade
secret information pose a potential threat to the preservation of secrecy if they should leave the firm, confidentiality provisions should
be made a part of employment contracts, often with accompanying
covenants not to compete against the employer.1 97 These employee
agreements should state:
1. That the employee may have access to company confidential proprietary information or trade secrets;
2. That in regard to this information, the company may be under
obligations of confidentiality to others;
3. That such information should be kept confidential by the employee and should not be disclosed to any third party, directly or
indirectly, without the prior written consent of the company;
4. That, upon termination of employment, any information or data
developed during employment which is the property of the company should be returned to the company.
D. Confidentiality Obligations of Outside Service Organizations
Outside service organizations may be resistant to signing nondisclosure agreements, since they will not voluntarily choose to acquire additional potential liabilities. However, because the agency
theory is more tenuously applicable to these outside organizations,
197. See Krendl & Krendl, Noncompetition Covenants in Colorado: A Statutory Solution?, 52 Denver L.J. 499 (1975).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol12/iss4/2

38

Soma and Youngs: Confidential Communications and Information in a Computer Era
19841

CONFIDENTIALITY AND COMPUTERS

non-disclosure agreements from these groups are very important and
should include at least the following provisions: 198
1. The vendor should acknowledge that under the terms of the service agreement, the service organization may have access to hardware or software with respect to which the law firm or corporation
may be under obligations of confidentiality to others, or which may
contain confidential/proprietary information or trade secrets of the
law firm or corporation or other parties.
2. The service organization should agree to maintain and cause its
employees, servants and agents to maintain the confidentiality of
all trade secrets, business or financial information, software programs and content, and any and all information, data, reports,
analysis whatsoever, disclosed or otherwise made available to, or
obtained by the service organization's performance of, services
under the agreement.
3. The service organization should agree to supply the names of its
employees, servants or agents who will have access to such confidential/proprietary information or the service organization should
require each of these persons to provide the law firm or corporation
a written acknowledgement that the confidentiality obligations
under the agreement have been read and understood by these employees, and should further agree to provide updates as personnel
change.
4. There should be a reasonable limit on the length of time the
confidentiality agreements are enforceable after the termination of
the service or employment agreement, within which the confidentiality obligations are maintained.
It should be recognized that the vendor's fear of accepting liability under these circumstances may make an agreement on nondisclosure provisions difficult to reach, and success may well depend
on the bargaining strength of the customer. One possible approach
that may alleviate the vendor's concerns would be to simply agree
that, with regard to privileged matters, damages are waived and the
parties consent only to injunctive relief. Of course, that approach
198. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1982), makes certain payments by issuers of securities to foreign officials or other foreign persons illegal, and therefore
requires such issuers to maintain accurate records. The law requires the issuer to "devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances
that ... access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general or specific authorization ....
Id. at § 78m(b)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). This duty to take reasonable precautions to protect the assets of the corporation implies a duty to require confidential agreements.
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would probably not be useful for trade secrets.' 9 9
These written obligations act as notice or warning to the service
organization that it may have access to certain proprietary information that the law firm or corporation expects the service organization
to treat with care. If such contractual agreements cannot be obtained, it is suggested that notice be given to the organization in
some other form, such as a letter of understanding, that informs the
service person at the commencement of the service that information
contained in the computer should be kept confidential.20 0
V.

CONCLUSION

The changing methods of storing information brought about by
the developing computer and communications technology compel a
new look at the treatment of confidential information in both the
legal and business setting. At present, there is little case law indicating how courts will view these technological changes and whether
they will permit the creation of data bases containing confidential or
privileged business information to be free from discovery. Although
absolute secrecy is not necessary to sustain trade secret protection,
strict protection should still be accorded trade secrets contained on
computer data bases, and the steps recommended by this article
should assist in their preservation.
The crux of the potential difficulty lies with the testimonial privileges that require the most stringent form of confidentiality to sustain the status of the privileged information. Whether the courts will
view the placement of otherwise privileged communications into
computer data bases as a de facto waiver of the privilege will depend
on the policy arguments for disclosure of confidential information.
To exclude confidential data bases from the trend in favor of disclosure would not broaden or enlarge the scope of the testimonial privileges. These privileges protect the communication of information between those in a special relationship. The information itself is not
privileged and may be discovered by other means and in other settings. Treating computer data bases similarly to manual file systems
for the purpose of these privileges will not defeat this basic legal
premise.
The recommendations suggested in this article are intended to
be the reasonable precautions that should be taken to maintain the
199.

See supra note 195.

200. See Appendix for suggested language.
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testimonial privileges and trade secret protection within a computerized file system. Due to the unsettled nature of the law in the area of
privileged communications; it is also suggested that attorneys cautiously utilize computerized filing systems for highly confidential
materials.
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APPENDIX

NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

This Nondisclosure Agreement is applicable only to (Facility or
Site

Name),

is

for a period of
and shall provide Service Vendor with written

notification of expanded applicability if other sites are added. In the
event of termination, Service Vendor's Obligation of Confidentiality
shall survive and be binding upon Service Vendor for a period of
after the date of termination.

Service Vendor hereby acknowledges that it may have access to
Non-Service Vendor equipment and software at Vendee premises
with respect to which Vendee may be under obligations of confidentiality to others, or which may contain confidential proprietary information or trade secrets of Vendee or others. Service Vendor agrees
to maintain, and to cause its employees, servants, and agents to
maintain the confidentiality of all trade secrets, business or financial
or geological information, equipment configurations, software programs and content, and any and all information, data, reports, analysis whatsoever, disclosed or otherwise made available to, or obtained by Service Vendor, its employees, its agents or servants,
directly or indirectly, in connection with Service Vendor performing
services hereunder, or examining books, records, or equipment of
Vendee, its subsidiaries or affiliates, PROVIDED that, Service Vendor shall be under no such obligation of confidentiality with respect
to any information in, or becoming a part of, the public domain
through no fault of the Service Vendor.

SERVICE VENDOR EMPLOYEE CONFIDENTIALITY STATEMENT

Service Vendor agrees that it shall promptly identify to the
Vendee, the names of Service Vendor employees, contractors and
agents who will have access to Confidential Information and that
Service Vendor shall require each person to provide Vendee a written acknowledgement in the form set forth as an Exhibit hereto that
such person has read and understood this Confidentiality Agreement,
and personally agrees to comply with the terms thereof.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY OBLIGATION

The undersigned hereby acknowledges that he/she has read and
understands that certain Confidentiality Agreement dated
(herein "Service Venby
dor"). In consideration of the undersigned's employment by Service
Vendor and receipt of the Confidentiality Information as described
in such Agreement, the undersigned agrees to comply with all the
obligations of Service Vendor in such Agreement as fully and to the
same extent as if the undersigned were signatory thereto.
day
Acknowledged and agreed to this
19

9.

SERVICE VENDOR NAME
Employee Name
Employee Address
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